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REMARKS BY PJ MODE*
There were two important events in January 1970. First, I joined Senator
Birch Bayh’s staff as his senior lawyer and chief counsel of the
Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments. Second, on January 19,
President Richard Nixon, continuing to pursue his “Southern strategy” for
reelection, nominated G. Harrold Carswell of Florida for a seat on the U.S.
Supreme Court.1 Carswell had been a district judge for eleven years and had
been elevated to the Fifth Circuit by Nixon only a few months before, over
strong opposition from the Leadership Conference on Civil and Human
Rights on account of his racist record.2 Early in his career, Carswell had
happily announced himself a white supremacist for life, and his judicial
record in civil rights cases was one of interminable delay, followed by
unconscionable rulings, all the while abusing lawyers who were Black or
represented civil rights interests.3 The civil rights community and organized
labor were implacably opposed.4
The problem was that no one thought there was any chance of defeating
him. The Senate had just months before rejected another Southern judge,
Clement Haynsworth of South Carolina, in a bruising fight led by Birch
Bayh, and everyone was certain that the next Nixon appointee would sail
through the Senate.5 No one could see anywhere near fifty votes.
Through Birch’s legislative skill, we managed to create some delay one
bite at a time: five weeks from committee hearings to floor debate, a one-
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1. See Robert B. Semple Jr., Southerner Named to Supreme Court; Carswell, 50, Viewed
as Conservative, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 20, 1970), https://www.nytimes.com/1970/01/20/
archives/southerner-named-to-supreme-court-carswell-50-viewed-as.html [https://perma.cc/
UB2B-WHUX].
2. See id.
3. See Anthony Lewis, The Significance of Judge Carswell, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 7, 1970),
https://www.nytimes.com/1970/03/07/archives/the-significance-of-judge-carswell.html
[https://perma.cc/5ZFN-X3L5].
4. See id.; see also Paul Delaney, Lobby in Senate Fights Carswell, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
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week debate, and two and a half weeks to final vote.6 That provided some
chance to build support.
And when lawyers began to look at Carswell’s judicial record, we were
able to open an entirely new front. It turned out that, even putting aside the
racism, he was patently unqualified. He was lazy and unprofessional. His
writing was mechanical and incomprehensible. His output of written
opinions averaged sixteen pages a year, and those he did write were reversed
at an alarming rate.7 A group of Columbia Law students did an astounding
statistical study of 15,000 decisions by every district court judge in the Fifth
Circuit over an eleven-year period—without LexisNexis and computers—
and found his reversal rate was 59 percent, three times the average rate.8 He
ranked sixty-first of the sixty-seven judges on the circuit—and he was getting
worse as time went on!9
In the meantime, we had been working with a group of the nation’s most
distinguished, establishment, white-shoe lawyers. At a press conference we
set up on March 11, they released a statement signed by 457 law school
deans, professors, and establishment lawyers from around the country
opposing Carswell.10 The statement concluded that aside from Carswell’s
record of “white supremacy and ugly racism, he does not have the legal or
mental qualifications essential for service on the Supreme Court or any high
court in the land, including the one where he now sits.”11 The story ran on
page one of the New York Times and everywhere else.12 We were
immediately flooded with support from others around the country.
Thereafter, anytime we needed to, we could generate support from the Salt
Lake City Bar Association, to regional editorial boards in Hawaii, to the dean
and faculty of the University of Arkansas School of Law.
The opening day of debate, five days later, brought us unexpected good
luck. Frustrated by questions of Carswell’s competence, Senator Roman
Hruska of Nebraska came off the Senate floor for a radio interview, in which
he said, “Even if he were mediocre, there are a lot of mediocre judges and

6. See 116 CONG. REC. 39,905 (1970); see also John Paul Hill, Nixon’s Southern Strategy
Rebuffed: Senator Marlow W. Cook and the Defeat of Judge G. Harrold Carswell for the U.S.
Supreme Court, 112 REG. KY. HIST. SOC’Y 613, 620–31 (2014) (delineating Carswell’s
confirmation process in the Senate Committee on the Judiciary).
7. See 116 CONG. REC. 7493–94 (discussing Judge Carswell’s judicial record); see also
Bruce H. Kalk, The Carswell Affair: The Politics of a Supreme Court Nomination in the Nixon
Administration, 42 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 261, 276 (1998).
8. See 116 CONG. REC. 7494, 7504, 9607–10.
9. See id. at 9607; see also Fred P. Graham, Carswell’s Credo Is Restraint, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan.
21,
1970),
https://www.nytimes.com/1970/01/21/archives/carswells-credo-isrestraint.html [https://perma.cc/KVY8-MRAK].
10. See 116 CONG. REC. 7854; see also Fred P. Graham, Carswell Review Urged on
Senate, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 13, 1970), https://www.nytimes.com/1970/03/13/archives/
carswell-review-urged-on-senate-457-in-law-field-ask-new-hearings-a.html
[https://
perma.cc/RZ7B-2U32].
11. 116 CONG. REC. 4962.
12. See, e.g., Graham, supra note 10.
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people and lawyers, and they are entitled to a little representation, aren’t
they?”13 Because there was audio, the statement had a massive impact.
The final vote on April 8 was 51 to 45.14 The four absentees were evenly
split.15 In the end, Nixon did not nominate another Southern racist to fill this
seat. Instead, he chose a virtually unknown judge from Minnesota, a
dependable conservative named Harry Blackmun.16
The most essential element in this victory was Birch Bayh’s political and
legislative experience and skill: in gaining delay, in exploiting errors on the
other side, in motivating and huddling with the team of establishment lawyers
and deans, in sensing how and where to focus the vast network of supporters
we’d built.
But most of all, Birch showed moral leadership by stepping up when no
one wanted to. Phillip Hart of Michigan and Joseph Tydings of Maryland
were up for reelection.17 Ted Kennedy was maintaining a low profile as he
sought to recover from the Chappaquiddick incident the previous July.18
Birch had just led the bruising Haynsworth fight, and he was rightly fearful
of damaging bipartisan relationships essential to his most important
objective, the passage of electoral reform.19 At a time before the
“mediocrity” issue had come into focus, at a time when it seemed to all of us
that this was a losing fight—and knowing that he would pay a price for the
decision—he nevertheless stepped up because he could not stand aside and
see a white supremacist take a seat on the Supreme Court.
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17. See Eileen Shanahan, Tydings Loses to Beall in Maryland Senate Race, N.Y. TIMES
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L. Madden, Tighter for Civil Rights, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 27, 1976),
https://www.nytimes.com/1976/12/27/archives/fighter-for-civil-rights.html [https://perma.cc/
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18. See Lorraine Boissoneault, Why the True Story of ‘Chappaquiddick’ Is Impossible to
Tell, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Apr. 2, 2018), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/why-truestory-chappaquiddick-impossible-tell-180968638/
[https://perma.cc/F6KK-F74R]
(discussing the July 18, 1969, incident, in which Senator Edward Kennedy was involved in a
car crash on Chappaquiddick Island, Massachusetts).
19. See Warren Weaver Jr., Senate Unit Asks Popular Election of the President, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 24, 1970), https://www.nytimes.com/1970/04/24/archives/senate-unit-askspopular-election-of-the-president-amendment-to.html [https://perma.cc/477H-X2Z9].

